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CHAPTER 7
Reforming the Energy Sector
Abstract This chapter describes how Georgia modernized its energy
sector. When Nika Gilauri took ofﬁce as minister of energy in 2004,
blackouts were the norm, power was supplied to customers only for a
few hours a day, and only about 30 percent of the power used was actually
paid for. The Ministry of Energy itself suffered frequent power outages.
The situation was further aggravated by seasonal effects. In Georgia,
where hydroelectric power is the primary source of energy, generation
peaks in summer, but consumption peaks in the cold winters. As a result,
Georgia has long depended on seasonal energy imports and was deep in
debt with all neighboring countries. This chapter tells the story of how the
government turned things around through decisive industry restructuring.
By 2006, the country had 24-hour energy supply even in remote areas,
and the payment rate had reached 96 percent. And one year later, in 2007,
Georgia has turned into net electricity exporter.
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7.1 GEORGIA’S ENERGY SECTOR IN 2004
The reform of the energy sector was one of the most crucial, and most
visible, reforms undertaken in Georgia between 2004 and 2007. It was
vital for the economic development of the country. No business can
prosper when electricity blackouts are the norm. What is more, this reform
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was also politically crucial for the success of the new government. The
desolate state of the energy sector was one of the key drivers of
dissatisfaction with the previous government. In fact, it was among the
main reasons for the Rose Revolution, and everybody expected signiﬁcant
improvements.
In 2004, the Georgian energy sector was riddled with all sorts of
issues – technical, economic, and political:
• Technical. The electricity grid was not equipped to operate indepen-
dently. It had been designed during the Soviet era to operate within
the much larger system spanning the Caucasus and southern Russia.
And because maintenance had long been neglected, most transmis-
sion lines needed replacement. Operations depended on a handful of
people who knew how to work the controls. Most of the distribution
network lacked metering. There was no transparency about who was
consuming how much energy. Hydropower and thermal power
plants suffered from malfunction on a daily basis. Some of the largest
hydroelectric power plants were in fact permanently out of order. In
the winter, electricity was supplied to customers only for two to three
hours per day. In some regions, supply was as low as two to three
hours per week. Customers had long given up hopes of 24-hour
supply. Rather, they demanded to be notiﬁed in advance of when to
expect the two to three hours of supply they had grown accustomed
to. The Ministry of Energy itself had no electricity.
• Economic. The tariff system was inappropriate. Even if all fees had
been collected, the electricity sector would still have been losing
money. But in fact, the collection rate was below 30 percent, and
as low as 10 percent in some cases. There were no funds to maintain
the system or even pay salaries. The staff of most energy sector
companies had not been paid for 20–24 months. As a consequence,
there were strikes at hydroelectric power plants and dispatch centers
almost every week. Worst of all, the limited proceeds of the energy
sector were used to subsidize the rest of the economy. Because of its
structure, size, and corrupt practices, the energy sector was not only
the main source of income for high-level public ofﬁcials (especially in
regions outside of the capital Tbilisi), but it was also one of the main
sources of subsidies for other sectors, many of which were based on
corrupt deals brokered by top decision makers. For example, one of
the largest consumers of electrical power, a ferroalloy plant, did not
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pay for energy at all because it was under the protection of the
president Shevardnadze’s family members. Some villages in one of
the regions did not pay for gas because they were very active politi-
cally. Other villages simply diverted gas from pipelines that passed
through their territory illegally.
• Political. In 2003, energy was one of the most corrupt sectors in
Georgia. As the only industry that generated any cash at a regional
level, it was the main source of illegal income for regional govern-
ment representatives. Many criminals were making money in the
sector. Whatever money was collected by the distribution companies
was not re-invested but pocketed by the managers of the distribution
companies who paid off both government ofﬁcials (to avoid prose-
cution) and criminals (to prevent attacks). On a more mundane level,
theft of gas pipes was a frequent occurrence. The single largest
producer of electricity (Enguri, Vardnili Cascade power plants) was
located in a territory that was not controlled by the government of
Georgia, in a Russian occupied region of Abkhazia, although the
dam was on controlled territory. As a result, there was next to no
accountability and very limited control. On a national level, the
energy sector had debts with all of Georgia’s neighboring countries,
both for electricity and gas delivery.
The energy sector had been broken down into many different companies
and entities. As a result, nobody was responsible for anything.
Decentralization may work well for countries in which there are no energy
problems, and where everything is running smoothly, such as the United
States or many Western European countries. But in developing countries
with energy problems, decentralization makes things worse. Without cen-
tral accountability and oversight, ofﬁcials blame each other for blackouts
and other issues. In Georgia, distribution companies were blaming the
transmission company for the blackouts. The transmission company was
blaming dispatch, and dispatch was blaming the generation companies.
Generation companies were blaming GWEM (the Georgian Wholesale
Electricity Market operator), and everybody was blaming the Ministry of
Energy and the independent regulator (GNERC). In turn, the central
institutions blamed every company and agency further down the chain.
Paradoxically, they all had a valid point.
Two years later, Georgia had 24-hour electricity supply, except for a
few days after Russia blew up two gas pipelines and one high-voltage line
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simultaneously. The collection rate went from 30 percent in 2004 to 91
percent in 2007 (including commercial losses) – one of the fastest jumps
ever seen in this ﬁgure globally. By 2007, Georgia was a net electricity
exporter. Let’s look at how Georgia made it happen. While some solutions
were speciﬁc to Georgia, others will be instructive to many countries
facing energy problems, be they small or big, developed, or developing.
7.2 TEMPORARY CENTRALIZATION OF COMMAND
FOR IMPROVED ACCOUNTABILITY
Before the reforms, different agencies were responsible for different deci-
sions. Long-term policy was formulated by the Ministry of Energy. The
annual electricity balance was approved by GWEM (the Georgian
Wholesale Electricity Market operator). The tariff scheme and regulatory
rules were approved by an independent regulator (GNERC). New regula-
tion gave all powers, except for tariff approval, to the Ministry of Energy.
Even tariffs were negotiated with companies on a case-by-case basis by the
ministry, and only ﬁnal legal approval was in the hands of the GNERC.
Even though the Ministry of Economy formally owned the energy com-
panies, the Ministry of Energy appointed their directors. In effect, all
decision-making power started to be concentrated in one institution.
This also meant that the ministry was fully responsible for what happened
in the sector. It could not blame anybody else for poor performance. This
was the key to the success of the reforms. Once the crisis was contained,
the government started to decentralize the sector again step by step.
7.3 CHANGE OF STAFF AND MANAGEMENT CONTRACTS
TO END CORRUPTION
At almost every energy company and every state agency, new manage-
ment was put in place. Previously, salaries of civil servants had been so
low that nobody could survive on them alone. Everybody was making
money on the side. To put an end to these practices, new staff and new
management were brought in from outside of the energy sector, and
young low-level employees were promoted. In some cases, international
companies were contracted to manage selected state-owned energy
companies. This brought an inﬂux of modern management practices
and technical know-how. In Georgia, the presence of expatriates in the
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management of energy distribution companies was an important cata-
lyst that made it easier to justify non-paying customers having their
power supply disconnected. Somebody needed to take the blame for
these tough decisions, and the expat managers served as scapegoats in
the public eye.
7.4 COMMUNAL METERING TO DRIVE UP COLLECTION RATES
Low collection was the root of most evil in the energy sector. Because only
about one-third of all power provided to customers was paid for, the
sector lost money on every kWh sold. The payments simply did not
cover the cost of production. Effectively, there was a negative incentive
to produce any power at all. This is why the Ministry of Energy and the
distribution companies focused their efforts on collection. Key measures
included:
• Legal changes, which were introduced to make the theft of electricity,
and tampering with meters, punishable by law.
• Communal meters, which were installed in all regions, as well as in
many districts of large cities. Each communal meter covered 30–60
households. Payments were due based on the measurement of the
communal meter. The distribution company disregarded individual
meters, many of which had previously been manipulated or bypassed
with so-called “ﬁsh hooks.” If the distribution company did not
receive full payment for energy supplied according to the communal
meter, the whole community was disconnected. As soon as whole
villages or communities were obliged to pay based on a communal
meter, neighbors started keeping an eye out for “ﬁsh hooks” and
disconnecting each other’s illegal power lines. Initially, there was
some unrest, but the political message was very clear: put up with
communal metering or get by without electricity. Communities that
paid were rewarded with 24-hour supply of electricity. This was to
show other communities that those who paid did not just get elec-
tricity for a few hours a day but around the clock. Local police chiefs
who took the side of violators were ﬁred. The policy became very
well known in a short period of time, and protests against communal
metering eventually calmed down. The next step was the rehabilita-
tion of local distribution networks. Closed lines and new individual
meters were installed.
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• Non-paying customers were disconnected. Previously, distribution
companies had not been able to disconnect their largest customers,
such as major factories and transport companies. These had been
identiﬁed as direct customers and were supplied directly by the
GWEM (the Georgian Wholesale Electricity Market operator).
Companies with close ties to the previous president’s family or the
government never paid their electricity bills, but nobody dared to
disconnect them. They were untouchable. Hospitals did not pay
their bills either. They blackmailed the energy sector, saying that if
they were disconnected people might die. In fact, many hospitals
were running proﬁtable side businesses selling energy to local bak-
eries, restaurants, bars, and cafés through illegal lines. The new
government put an end to these practices. Everybody had to pay
their electricity bill in full. As Minister of Energy, I personally dis-
connected non-compliant hospitals to send a message that excep-
tions would no longer be tolerated. Speciﬁcally, all government
agencies − army bases, prisons, water supply utilities − were obliged
to pay their electricity bills in full. How can you expect the private
sector to pay if the public sector doesn’t? Going forward, every
minister would have to budget for electricity payments, something
that was unheard of until 2004.
• Corrupt private distribution companies were banned. In the early
2000s, corrupt ofﬁcials had effectively privatized service to well-
paying customers. These blackmailed the most proﬁtable customers
to switch from Georgia’s main distribution company, UDC, to
newly formed private distribution companies (DisCos). The owners
of these DisCos, who usually were also managers or board members
at state-owned distribution companies, would deliberately discon-
nect some parts of large cities and leave only DisCo customers with
power. This was to demonstrate that switching to a DisCo would
guarantee them better service, although even the customers of
DisCos did not get 24-hour supply, simply because the system as a
whole was in such poor repair. DisCos routinely cherry-picked the
most solvent and most compliant customers, leaving public distribu-
tors with those who couldn’t, or wouldn’t, pay their bills. This
privatization of proﬁts pushed the whole sector toward bankruptcy
and created additional sources of corruption. In 2004, the govern-
ment decided to annul all private licenses and put all UDC assets
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under the management of an independent international contractor.
This change to the structure of the system was very difﬁcult to push
through, but it was one of the most important catalysts in Georgia’s
energy reform.
• A simple incentive scheme was introduced. Once the system of
extortion by untouchable customers and embezzlement by corrupt
ofﬁcials was overcome, the Ministry of Energy proceeded to incen-
tivize collection compliance. As part of the reforms, the UDC was
split into 50 distribution regions. The grid was split between these
regions in a way that made it next to impossible to cheat with
regard to the electricity received by each region. From then on,
every director of a region was assessed based only on the collection
rate in that region. All other indicators were disregarded to keep the
incentive scheme as simple as possible. Every month, the managers
of the top-performing regions got a substantial bonus, and the
managers of the lowest-performing regions were ﬁred – every
month, for nine months in a row. By the end of that period, the
collection rate had tripled.
7.5 FROM SINGLE BUYER TO DEREGULATED STRUCTURE
Energy generation in Georgia is based on hydroelectric power in the
summer, when there is typically an oversupply of energy, and gas-ﬁred
thermal power plants in the winter, when heating systems draw the most
power. Gas needs to be imported, which means that energy production is
ﬁve to six times as costly in the winter as it is in the summer. Before 2004,
wintertime blackouts were the norm.
Prior to our reforms, not only distribution but also wholesale prices
had been the same throughout the year, based on the actual average
cost of generating energy in different seasons. This system was modeled
on some European countries, but it proved inappropriate for Georgia.
The plan was to have the Georgian Wholesale Electricity Market
(GWEM) buy cheap hydroelectrically generated energy in the summer
and sell it at prices above the cost of production. That way, the GWEM
would build up funds in the summer, enabling it to sell thermal energy
to customers below the high cost of production in the winter. The snag
was that the build-up of funds in the summer never happened because
of the low collection rate. So in the winter, the GWEM had to buy
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expensive energy from generators and sell it to customers cheaply. The
power generated by hydroelectric power plants was insufﬁcient to
satisfy wintertime demand. To close the gap, Georgia had to import
energy or switch on its gas-ﬁred thermal power plants. But both
options required full payment, often in advance because of the accu-
mulated debt to providers in neighboring countries, for which there
were no funds. In response to the inevitable shortages, the central
dispatcher was ordered to disconnect customers, and the blaming
game would start. Distribution companies blamed the GWEM for not
having enough funds in the winter, the GWEM blamed distributors for
not paying their bills during the summer, and everybody blamed the
Ministry of Energy for the inappropriate pricing system. As a result, the
energy sector ran into serious ﬁnancial difﬁculties and required addi-
tional government subsidies every winter. In 2005, this system was
abandoned. All distribution companies and large customers were
given the freedom to purchase electricity directly from local energy
providers or from importers – at prices covering the actual cost of
generation at the time of consumption. Distribution companies were
put in charge to prepare their individual electricity supply contracts
independently. In parallel, wholesale price setting was de-regulated to
reﬂect seasonal changes in supply and demand. Distribution companies
ﬁnally had to pay higher prices in the winter, as they should have done
from the beginning. The year the new system was introduced was the
year Georgia put an end to the blackouts.
In addition, the Ministry of Energy negotiated new international
energy trade contracts to export surplus electricity in the summer and
import electricity in the winter.
7.6 CHECKS AND BALANCES
Before 2004, there were no checks and balances in the system at all,
neither at a technical level nor at a ﬁnancial level. No records were kept of
the production or consumption of energy, neither by generation facilities
nor by distribution companies. Special inter-agency teams were set up to
check these ﬁgures, but most of the specialists were involved in the very
bribery schemes they were tasked with detecting and eradicating. Private
entities tried to maximize their proﬁts at the expense of state-owned
companies, while the managers of these companies were so poorly paid
that they saw corrupt practices as the only way to make a decent living.
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Making money on the side was generally not seen as criminal, or even
immoral, but as inevitable. The system was so dysfunctional that there
were many anecdotal cases when electricity generated by state-owned
power plants was often credited to private power plants for some off-the-
record cash reward to an ofﬁcial. The private power plant then proceeded
to charge customers, most of which were also state-owned companies,
for energy that had, in fact, been generated by the state in the ﬁrst place.
In other cases, ofﬁcials credited private power plants with virtual energy
generation that only served to create debts of a public company to the
private entity. Parts of the proceeds were used to pay off the ofﬁcials,
while the rest went to private companies. The new government put an
end to such schemes. Proper checks and balances, ﬁnancial as well as
technical, were introduced. Step by step, most of the sector was priva-
tized, except for GSE and Enguri HPP. The remaining state-owned
companies were put under new management, and the new managers
were paid much higher salaries and bonuses to prevent corruption.
Electronic meters with GSM systems were installed. These meters trans-
mit readings to the central electronic hub every hour, a measure that
makes it much easier to detect irregularities before they spin out of
control. Black holes were closed, and clear rules were established.
Unpaid bills, blackouts, capacity constraints, and debts to neighboring
countries were a thing of the past.
7.7 INTRODUCTION OF A FACT-BASED TARIFF SYSTEM
During the very early stages of the reforms, tariffs covering the actual cost
of production would have been counter-productive. While the collection
rate was still low, law-abiding customers would have been unduly pun-
ished for their compliance. But once the collection rate hit 85 percent, the
government sat down with GNERC, the independent regulator, to deter-
mine how distribution companies should set tariffs going forward. In
2005, the ﬁrst tariff negotiations took place between privately held dis-
tribution companies and the Ministry of Energy. Many different aspects
were taken into consideration: What were the technical needs of the grid
itself, and what funds were needed for its full restoration? In what time
frame? What was the policy of the ministry regarding the development of
new generation facilities? Which parts of these facilities should be built by
private distribution companies? What were the cash ﬂow requirements?
Once these questions were answered, a mutually acceptable tariff and a
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ﬁve-year investment program were agreed upon by the companies and the
ministry. Thanks to these candid talks, relations between the government
and the distributors reached a new, constructive level. The process and the
mutual obligations it resulted in removed the uncertainty that previously
hindered the development of the sector. I recommend conducting such
tariff negotiations every ﬁve to seven years, starting two years before an
existing ﬁve-year deal expires.
Subsequent to the negotiations, the parameters of the tariff scheme
were submitted to GNERC, the regulator, for review and approval.
While direct negotiations between the government and the distributor
were important to clear away structural roadblocks, oversight by an
independent body was no less important. Without an independent reg-
ulator, any government would be tempted to decrease tariffs before an
election to win the favor of voters at the expense of the energy sector.
7.8 NEW MARKET RULES
The ﬁnal stage of the reform of the energy sector in Georgia was
launched in 2009, when the government introduced its new market
rules. The objective of these rules was not to make a lot of changes
that would only create uncertainty but to offer a long-term vision to all
stakeholders, especially regarding the deregulation of the sector and
the construction of new hydroelectric power plants. In 2009, only
large customers, i.e., those who were connected to the high-voltage
grid, were allowed to purchase electricity directly from generation
companies. Everybody else had to buy their electricity from distribu-
tion companies. The government approved a 12-year plan, according
to which the threshold for direct purchases would be decreased, step
by step, to 1 kWh of consumption at the lowest voltage level by the
year 2021. This gave distribution companies a more reliable planning
perspective. It also increased the motivation for new private investors
to build power plants. Additionally, small hydroelectric power plants
(below a capacity of 13 MW) would not be regulated at all. They
would be able to sell electricity at any price, while the prices were
capped by the regulator for larger plants. The goal was to attract
signiﬁcant foreign direct investment to Georgia’s energy sector.
Georgia has rivers with stable ﬂows all year round, as well as sites ﬁt for
power generation near grid hubs and major roads. But because of past
neglect, many of these sites remain undeveloped to this day. This is why
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constructing hydroelectric power plants in Georgia is only about half as
costly as in other countries, where the best sites are already developed.
What is more, the Georgian grid is well connected to its neighboring
networks. As a result, there is high demand from international investors
to build hydroelectric power plants in Georgia. The trouble was that, for a
long time, the process of acquiring a license for construction was very
complicated. It involved many government agencies, took a long time,
and discouraged potential investors. You had to get approval for the site
development from the Ministry of Energy and from the local authority for
land acquisition or a land lease agreement. Additionally, you had to apply to
the Ministry of the Environment for water usage rights and to the Ministry
of Economy for construction. Connecting a new plant to the grid required
approval by as many as three different agencies (GSE, PPA, and ESCO).
The process was so complicated that nobody knew where even to start, or
which paper they would have to get ﬁrst. The new market rules radically
simpliﬁed this process and put one entity – the Ministry of Energy – in
charge of all government approval. In effect, power plant construction
became almost a one-stop shopping affair for investors. All licenses and
permits were coordinated by the Ministry of Energy on behalf of the
investor. A memorandum of understanding obliged all government agen-
cies to provide relevant documents to the investor through the Ministry of
Energy. Today, the entire process takes a maximum of three months. In
many other countries, that same process takes as long as two to three years.
As a result, the Georgian energy sector has become one of the most
attractive investment opportunities for private companies in the region,
and it has already attracted billions of U.S. dollars in foreign direct invest-
ment to the country.
7.9 THE KAZBEGI CUCUMBER CASE
Fast-forward to the spring of 2016. We are in a meeting room at the
Ministry of Energy in a Central Asian country. Participants include the
minister and his deputy on one side of the table, representatives of the
Asian Development Bank and me on the other side. The country is in a
predicament closely resembling that in Georgia in the early 2000s. Their
system has not been built to operate independently, but as a part of the
bigger Soviet system. Most electricity generation is based on hydro-
power. Relations with the country’s neighbors are difﬁcult, causing
problems with imports, high commercial losses, and accumulating
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debts. Our goal is to convince the minister that he is headed for a crash.
We are certain that, without reform, the system will face serious difﬁcul-
ties within the next three to ﬁve years. Based on my experience, it is quite
straightforward to calculate when the electricity system of any country
will collapse. You don’t even have to examine the technical conditions of
the generation facilities and transmission assets in detail. All you have to
do is look at the ﬁnancials of the sector: Do the tariffs cover the actual
cost of generation? If not, how big is the gap? What are the losses,
commercial as well as technical? How fast is debt accumulating? Which
other areas of the economy is the sector subsidizing with free or under-
priced energy? How much funding does the government provide to the
energy sector, if any?
If you study these ﬁgures for a period of ﬁve to seven years, you get a
good understanding of where the sector is going and when it will grind to
a halt. Georgia’s energy sector was bankrupt in the late 1990s. It took
another three to ﬁve years, until 2003, for it to collapse technically. While
the situation in the country we were advising was not as bad as it had been
in Georgia in the late 1990s, reforms were needed urgently, and I was
specially brought in to share my experience in Georgia. Their biggest
problem was cross-subsidization. The energy sector was subsidizing
other parts of the economy, such as water utilities and agricultural entities.
This is exactly what it had been like in Georgia when I took ofﬁce there,
and what it is still like today in many countries with electricity problems.
Here is how the conversation unfolded:
Minister: Even if we bring in management contractors from abroad, as
you advise, we will have to keep using proceeds from the
energy sector to subsidize water utilities and agriculture for
political reasons.
Nika Gilauri: I fully understand. I was in the very same situation a few years
ago. But the government is facing a simple choice: does it
want to have electricity or not? If the government needs
electricity, then the government has to pay for it. Even if
the system has survived many years of underﬁnancing, it will
not remain resilient forever. Also, I am guessing that some
public customers are actually receiving more electricity than
they really need. Believe me, I’ve seen it happen in my own
country.
Minister: What is your suggestion?
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Nika Gilauri: I amnot saying that you should disconnect all thewater utilities
and all agricultural entities right away. First of all, let’s calculate
how much electricity they really need. Then let the govern-
ment pay for this consumption. If they consume more, allow
the electricity distribution company to disconnect the entity in
question, or ﬁre its manager. That can be the ﬁrst step. But
everybody has to understand that subsidizing the rest of the
economy is not only your problem. It is a much bigger pro-
blem, and the government must deal with it.
The minister was not yet convinced. He liked the approach, but I felt a
practical example was needed to show the real extent of the problem and
illustrate how a small reform could turn out to make a big difference for
his country. And that’s when I remembered the cucumber story. It is a
story set in our Kazbegi region, high in the Georgian mountains, at an
altitude thousands of meters above sea level. As it happens, a high-pressure
gas pipeline passes through the region. Sometime in the 1990s, the
villagers had cut into the pipeline and started branching off gas. Initially,
it was only a very small amount, and I believe it had even been approved by
the government at the time. But year by year, the amount of gas diverted
by these villages increased signiﬁcantly. Of course, they were not paying
for the gas. In the winter months, it is extremely difﬁcult to get to the
region, and collecting money in these remote villages was almost impos-
sible. Eventually, special regulation was adopted, advocated by the mem-
ber of parliament for that region. This regulation made it legal for the local
population in high mountainous areas passed by high-pressure pipelines to
divert gas – as if there were many such regions in Georgia, which is not the
case. At some point in the 2000s, the amount of diverted gas had grown
completely out of proportion with the number of households in the area.
And still many people argued that a huge company like the GGTC
(Georgina Gas Transportation Corporation) could afford to spare some
gas for these villages. My argument at the time was very simple: if we want
these villages to have gas for free, ﬁne. But let’s bring the deal out into the
open, rather than have the energy sector bear the burden. Put a number
on it, and let the government pay the GGTC for whatever energy these
villages need.
When we investigated the root causes of the dramatic increase in
consumption, it turned out that many Kazbegi locals had started to build
greenhouses and cultivate cucumbers. By December 2004, every household
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in the region had at least one greenhouse and was using free gas to warm it up
year-round, at an altitude of thousands of meters above sea level, where
temperatures drop to −20 or even −30 degrees Celsius in the winter.
Some households were said to run as many as half a dozen greenhouses.
When a window of a greenhouse broke, they didn’t bother ﬁxing it. Rather,
they simply increased the gas pressure. From their perspective, they were
acting quite rationally. A new window would have cost them money, but
gas was free. So my argument was to subsidize the gas, but openly and
transparently: Let’s calculate the value of the gas these villages really need,
and let the Ministry of Finance pay the GGTC for it. When that decision was
ﬁnally made after much debate, we sent a special team to the region to
estimate how much gas was consumed by households for heating their
homes and how much was consumed for commercial purposes. When we
did the math, we found that the true cost of a single cultivated Kazbegi
cucumber was more than GEL 20 (approximately USD 13). At the time,
cucumbers were sold at GEL 2–3 per kilo. Our calculations showed that it
would be cheaper to buy the greenhouses from the locals and have them
dismantled, rather than keep on subsidizing the gas that was used to heat
them. So that’s what we did in 2005.
The cucumber story put a smile on the minister’s face. He said that, in
all probability, similar things were going on in his country. It remains to be
seen what action he will take.
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